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This manuscript studies the market conduct of the milk manufacturers and retail chains 
in a Midwestern state in the U.S. Following the menu approach we employ a random coefficient 
logit demand model to investigate several possible scenarios on the supply side. Demand 
estimates are obtained using both cross-sectional and time series variation in data. We also 
allow annual variation in consumer demographics which helps identify the coefficients of 
interaction between consumer demographics and product characteristics. To further enhance 
identification power we allow choice set of milk to vary across markets.  
The results are most supportive of the conjecture that manufacturers behave competitively letting 
the retailers be the residual claimants. Later they may collect a part or full rents from the 
retailers through two-part tariffs. 
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The U.S. food retailing sector has been undergoing several important changes recently. 
First and foremost, the concentration level in the U.S. food retailing sector has been on a rise 
over time. Some retail chains expanded their geographic coverage both intra and inter regionally, 
although  the  measure  is  still  lower  vis-à-vis  that  in  the  manufacturing  sector  and  non-food 
retailing. With potential efficiency gains from economies of scale being the major driving factor 
behind this new reality, the long-term implications are not clear cut (Food and Drink Weekly, 
2000). Secondly, introduction of new products and product differentiation have been occurring at 
an increasing rate (Martinez, 2007). Finally, the introduction of the private label products (PL)  
further  empowered  the  retail  end  of  the  food  marketing  system  in  their  dealings  against 
manufacturers and/or processors, while making them more flexible on the horizontal competitive 
landscape (Berges-Sennou et al., 2003).  
In theory retailers draw some power from the changes mentioned above, however whether this 
translates into market power exercised remains an empirical matter that must be investigated in 
the context of certain products and markets. In this application we focus on milk in a Midwestern 
state in the U.S. based on some anecdotal evidence pointing to retailers exercising market power 
against  upstream  players  in  the  food  marketing  system.  The  dynamics  of  the  farm  level 
(cooperatives) and retail prices of milk in a major city in the state under study is also supportive 
of this speculation (figure 1). Retail prices manifest sluggishness in their response to declining 
farm prices, while at certain points in time they rise faster than farm prices. Furthermore, in 
periods such as 2000 and early 2006 declining farm prices went hand-in-hand with rising retail 
prices. Given that farm level milk price constitutes a major part of the retail price and assuming that manufacturers and retailers did not incur negative cost shocks in these periods, a plausible 
scenario that remains is the market power exercise on the part of retailers.  
Following Von Cramon-Taubadel (1997), this might be suggestive of market power. Our choice 
of the state is explained by a relatively high concentration in the retail sector of the two cities 
(markets as defined by Information Resources Incorporated (IRI)). Specifically, three large retail 
chains have an aggregate 70 % market share. Moreover, we observe the same chains for the 
entire period of my study, which allows for tracking their behavior over time. 
We  investigate  the  milk  manufacturer  and  retailer  market  conduct  in  a  context  of  vertical 
interrelationships following a seminal work by Villas-Boas (2007). This allows us to analyze the 
competitive  behavior  of  the  upstream  players  in  milk  supply  chain  even  though  we  do  not 
observe wholesale milk prices. More specifically, we obtain direct estimates of market power by 
means of Lerner Index, while previous similar studies rely on conjectural variation approach to 
estimate how close an economic environment is to a competitive one. We rely on a random 
utility discrete choice framework to model the demand for milk for it projects milk demand on its 
various  attributes.  This  allows  handling  a  potentially  large  number  of  products.
3 Moreover, 
modeling somewhat realistic substitution patterns across the choice set in a given market has 
important implications for the economic effects,  which  underlie the estimates of the market 
power. For this reason  we employ random coefficient logit model for demand  (BLP, 1995), 
which allows each consumer sampled to have certain pattern of correlation across the choice set  
available across markets.
4    
                                                           
3 Quantity demand models like AIDS (Deaton and Muelbauer, 1980), on the other hand, are plagued with the curse 
of dimensionality, as the budget share equations are functions of product prices employed in the system 
4 This correlation may be expressed as  a function of systematic part as consumer observed demographics, as well as 
random part like unobserved  demographics  However,  unlike  previous  studies  (Villas-Boas  (2007),  BLP  (1995))  we  utilize  both  cross-
sectional (two cities) and time series variation (from 2001 to 2006) in market-level data. Also 
this is the first known study to allow annual variation in consumer demographics which will 
prove valuable identifying taste coefficients. Moreover, we allow the choice set to vary across 
markets to further enhance the identifying power of the model (Nevo, 2001). Following menu 
approach (Bresnahan, 1989), we make use of consistent estimates from the demand to navigate 
through several supply scenarios to find the best match with the data at hand.  
The remainder of this manuscript proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the data used 
in this analysis. Methodology used to estimate the demand for types of milk along with several 
supply  scenarios  to  be  tested  is  discussed  next.  Estimation  results  follow  immediately. 




The data used in this study are provided by the Information Resources Inc. (IRI). It is a 
product-level dataset on weekly basis and covers all the IRI markets across the United States for 
the period of 2001 through 2006. The variables covered include the quantities of milk sold at the 
major retail chains, the total dollar amount spent, and milk fat content. We focus on a 
Midwestern state in the U.S., which covers two IRI city-markets. 
Products are defined as combinations of manufacturer-retailer-milk fat content; this results in 
57 products (table 1). The retail prices are not observed, so we use the imputed unit values
5. 
Prices and quantities of milk sold are obtained by aggregating the relevant measures for the 
relevant four-week periods. I deflate prices from 2002 onwards using an aggregate CPI measure 
                                                           
5 This is another likely source of price endogeneity  caused  by measurement error for urban areas. To obtain the market shares of the goods used in the analysis and that of the 
outside good (non-purchase or amount of milk sold at other outlets in the same market) we 
define the potential market size in each city as a product of their respective populations and the 
per capita milk consumption in the United States in 2006. The market shares are then expressed 
as the ratio of the quantities of milk sold (expressed in servings, which was about 220 ounces of 
milk per person in a four-week period) to the potential market demand obtained above. 
Consequently, the share of the outside good is the difference between the overall demand and the 
actual market shares.  
The markets in question have been rather concentrated in the period under study. Three 
major retailers account for around 70 % of the overall sales (two retailer chains operate in both 
markets). Particularly, the retailer 3 is responsible for around 35 % of this measure (Market 
Scope, various years), and its average share in the dataset at hand is 26.5 % (table 2). As regards 
the manufacturers, private labels have the biggest share (about 36%) followed by the Dean Foods 
(2.4 %).  
  The IRI dataset was supplemented by data on cost components of milk production, 
specifically the electricity (industrial) and gasoline prices, average wages of employees in food 
sector, fluid grade milk price (which provides a good estimate of the wholesale price of milk).
6 
We also use the retail-level electricity prices, Federal funds effective interest rates, and the 
overall dollar turnover for each retailer provided by the IRI dataset. Given that it is not always 
possible to get finer data on cost that varies across products, we use the cost components above 
to instrument for prices in the estimation of the demand model. 
                                                           
6 Data on energy, wages were collected from the official website of BLS, Energy Information Administration, and 
the fluid grade milk price came from the Dairy Markets website (AAE Department, UW-Madison)   Furthermore, we randomly draw 100 observations on the household income, household 
head’s age, number of children under 18 years of age from the joint distribution of household 
demographics in the cities under study, which are used to model the random coefficients of 
marginal utility (disutility) of product attributes across consumers. Finally, we obtain the 
population dynamics in the two cities in question from the Market Scope in various years. 
 
Methodology 
      Milk Demand Specification 
 
We rely upon a random coefficient discrete choice utility framework to model the demand 
for  milk  given  the  relative  ease  with  which  these  models  accommodate  a  large  number  of 
differentiated  products
7.  Moreover, allowing the taste coefficients to vary across consumers 
results in a more realistic substitution patterns.  We assume that consumers have quasi-linear 
utility function  (to assume away the income effects)   with the corresponding indirect utility 
function given by  
ijt jt i jt i jt ijt U =x β -p α +ξ +ε (1)  
Here ijt U is the utility that consumer i derives from product j in time t,  jt x represents the observed 
product characteristics other than milk price, such as the fat content,  jt p is the price of 
th j
product in market t,  jt  embeds unobserved product characteristics (referred to as quality) , and 
ijt ε
 
is a mean zero  idiosyncratic  error term distributed independently and identically across 
                                                           
7 Quantity demand models such as the Almost Ideal Demand Systems (Deaton and  Muellbauer, 1980), alternatively, 
are derived from the consumer theory, however, they are plagued with the curse of dimensionality consumers, products and markets. We assume the underlying distribution for the latter term is 
type I Extreme Value, which yields a mixed logit demand specification.  
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Where α and β are the mean population parameters of the marginal utility/disutility of price and 
other product attributes,  i D  represents the observed consumer demographics,  i  is unobserved 
consumer demographics, usually following some parametric distribution, and   ,    measure 
heterogeneity in consumer tastes. Allowing the consumer taste coefficients to be a function of 
consumer demographics allows the choices across products to be correlated for each consumer. 
This yields realistic substitution patterns and helps overcome the Independence from Irrelevant 
Alternatives feature of the logit models. 
       Assuming each consumer purchases a unit of milk that yields the highest utility in the choice 
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Aggregating  over  consumers  we   get  the  market  share  for  the  product  j  given  by:   
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Own and cross price elasticity estimates are computed according to the following formulas: 
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Following Villas-Boas (2007) we consider six alternative supply scenarios in this application, 
which range from a simple linear pricing to vertical collusion among milk manufacturers and 
retailers. The assumption of constant marginal costs allows us to obtain the manufacturer and 
retailer Lerner indices using demand estimates and the optimality conditions from the respective 
supply scenario. The competing supply models are described in what follows: 
1.  Double marginalization 
This  is  a scenario of  linear pricing, where several  multi-product  Nash-Bertrand oligopolistic 
manufacturers and retailers maximize their profits separately, with manufacturer making the first 
move. To solve for the optimal prices at both levels we follow backward induction obtaining the 
optimality conditions for the downstream players first. The retailer e in market t is characterized 
by the following profit function 
  - - ( ) (6)
we
et it it it it iI et
p p c s p 

   where  et I represents the products in market t offered by retailer e, 
w
it p is the wholesale price of 
product i, 
e
it c  is marginal cost incurred by retailer e for 
th i product, and  () it sp is the 
th i product’s 
market share. 
The profit maximizing pure-strategy Nash-Bertrand prices find their reflection in the optimality 
condition given by 
    0 , for 1,..., (7)
we kt
it kt kt kt et e kI et it
s
s p p c i I e n
p 

      
   
with  e n being the number of active retailers in market t. 
Putting together the optimality conditions for all products, it can be shown that retailer e’s price 
over marginal cost markup in market t is  
 
1
* ( ) (8)
we
t t t e et t p p c O s p

      
Where  e O the ownership matrix for retailer e is,  et  is the first-order derivatives of the market 
shares  with  respect  to  all  prices  at  retail -level,  and  *  represents  element  by  element 
multiplication operator. 
In the same token manufacturers’ price-cost margin can be shown to equal the following 
 
1
* ( ) (9)
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
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Where 
w
t c a vector of marginal costs incurred by manufacturer w is  related to its offerings in 
market  t,  w O reflects its ownership structure, and  ( ( )) wt pw  is the  manufacturers’  response 
matrix given by 
( ( )) ( ) ( ) (10)
ww
kt kt kt kt kt kt s p w p s p p p         
Obtaining this matrix in terms observables (retail prices, actual market shares, and ownership 
structures)  is  of  great  importance  given  the  difficulty  of  obtaining  manufacturer  prices  in practice
8. As shown in Villas-Boas (2000), the reaction matrix of retail prices with respect to 
manufacturer prices can be obtained by totally differentiating the
th j equation in (7) with respect 
to a given wholesale price 
w
m p (that varies by
w
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Putting this in matrix terms, one obtains 0
w
mm G dp H dp  . In the same vein, differentiating the 
remaining retailer FOC conditions with respect to
w
m p , one obtains the 
th m column of the reaction 
matrix of retailer prices ( pt  ) to changes in manufacturer prices as
1 w
mm p p G H
    . Finally, 
the manufacturer response matrix can be computed  via
´
wt pt et     . Thus, the manufacturer 
price-cost markup can be computed using observables and demand estimates only, which fits our 
research objective given that we have no data on prices charged by milk manufacturers.   
2.  Hybrid model 
This is the same as the scenario above, the only difference being that retailers own private label 
milk. Therefore, retailers eliminate the manufacturer margin for these products. Retailer price-
marginal cost markup is given by (8), while that for manufacturers is given by 
 
1
* ( ) (11)
w e w h h
t t t w wt t p c c O s p

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Where 
h
w O is the usual manufacturer ownership matrix excluding the entries for private labels, 
and ()
h
t sp are the shares of national brand milk 
                                                           
8 Specifically, one needs to find an expression for 
w
kt kt pp  in terms of the observables 3.  Nonlinear pricing models 
The two opposing models considered here are the one with manufacturers following marginal 
cost pricing while allowing the retailers to be the residual claimant (manufacturers later extract a 
part or full monopoly rents), and the other way around. In the former case manufacturer price-
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In the latter scenario, the retailers obtain 0  margins, with manufacturers being the  residual 
claimants whose markup is determined by 
 
1
* ( ) (13)
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4.  Collusion at manufacturer level 
This scenario assumes manufacturers acting as a unity in maximizing their joint profit, while 
retailers still act individually, thus receiving the same markup as in the double marginalization 
case given by (8). Manufacturers’ markups, on the contrary, is given by (9), the only difference 
being in the manufacturer ownership matrix, which is now all ones.  
5.  Collusion at retailer level 
Manufacturers obtain markups by (9), and retailers by (8), such that retailers ownership matrix is 
all ones. 
 
6.  Vertical collusion / monopoly 
Here the manufacturers and retailers maximize their joint profit, acting as one enterprise (similar 
to a monopoly case). The markup is given by   
1
1 * ( ) (14)
ew
t t t et t p c c O s p

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     Empirical Results 
 
Demand is estimated via simulated GMM procedure given the market-level data in hand. 
Specifically,  we  simulate  choice  probabilities  for  each  consumer  sampled  from  the  Current 
Population Survey from 2001 through 2006 using their demographic characteristics, such as total 
household income, age of the household head, and the number of children in the households 
under 18 years of age. Unlike most other similar studies we make use of annual variation in 
demographics  by  drawing  a  different  sample  in  each  year,  which  is  crucial  for  obtaining 
statistically  significant  coefficients  for  interactions  of  product  features  and  consumer 
demographics. For unobserved demographics we use Halton draws from the standard normal 
distribution (Bhat, 1999). As shown by Bhat this minimizes the simulation error while making 
the estimation process much faster.  
To form the GMM objective function we need to construct the respective moment conditions 
(orthogonality conditions between the cost components and the structural error), however this is 
not feasible in a usual GMM framework (linearly additive errors) given that errors appear in a 
highly  nonlinear  fashion  in  the  demand  share  equations.  BLP  (1995)  provide  a  contraction 
mapping  which  allows  obtaining  the  structural  errors  through  the  inversion  of  the  demand 
equations. We then proceed to minimizing the GMM objective function, and repeat the process 
until its minimum is obtained.  Following the two-step procedure (Goldberg and Verboven, 2001) we estimate the demand 
model once and make use of these estimates in navigating through the supply scenarios presented 
above, to find the best match given the dataset at hand.  
As far as the demand model prices are clearly endogenous. This stems from simultaneous 
determination of supply of and demand for milk as in any structural framework. Moreover, we 
do not observe variables like advertising, and even specialty features like organic or lactose free
9, 
which contribute to the price endogeneity caused by omitted variable bias. Finally, the unit prices 
are computed as ratio of the dollar amount  spent to the amount sold of each milk product in a 
given market. This reinforces the price endogeneity that could be  engendered by measurement 
error. Houseman test for price endogeneity provides a strong support for this conjecture, namely 
prices are endogenous (table 1). Therefore,  one needs to control for endogeneity in prices  in 
order for the estimates of demand parameters to be reliable in a statistical sense. 
Following BLP (1995)  we  use instrumental variable approach within GMM framework to 
estimate demand. However, unlike them we use manufacturer and retailer cost components and 
product fixed effects to instrument prices
10. 
 Ideally prices would be instrumented using classical instrument, which is cost. However, we do 
not observe the wholesale prices, or the marginal costs of the manufacturers and retailers. 
Therefore,  we  use retailer and manufacturer cost components multiplied with product fixed 
effects (since we do not observe the exact amount of each input used in production of various 
products) following an approach by Villas-Boas (2007).  
 
                                                           
9 An important share of observations has missing milk characteristics, specifically whether it is organic or lactose 
free. While we recognize the impact these attributes might have on milk demand, incorporating them in the analysis 
would be possible at the expense of forgoing the above observations. 
10  Results from the logit specification 
 
The  results  from  the  multinomial  logit  and  the  instrumental  variable  approach  are 
presented in table 3. It can be seen that including the product fixed effects in the logit model 
handles  the  price  endogeneity  to  a  great  extent  (the  price  coefficient  more  than  doubles  in 
absolute  value),  while  applying  the  instrumental  variable  approach  further  corrects  for  the 
upward bias in the price coefficient.  
 
Results from the random coefficients specification 
 
The results from the full model are presented in table 4. The majority of the parameter 
estimates  are  statistically  significant  with  their  signs  conforming  to  our  expectations.  Price 
coefficients are mostly negative ranging from -55 to 0.8, with less than 0.01 % being positive 
(figure 2). Furthermore, empirical distributions of observed demographics seem to have played a 
more  important  role  in  determining  price  distribution  than  the  parametric  distribution  for 
unobserved demographics. The mean coefficient for price is also negative which decreases in 
income and the age of the household head, while decreasing in the number of children below 18 
years of age in the household. This implies that relatively richer, as well as older consumers tend 
to pay a higher price for milk, which might be explained by their possible choices of more of 
specialty milks, such as organic and lactose-free, and/or purchasing milk in smaller containers. 
The opposite situation seems plausible for households with children. 
The milk fat distribution looks like standard normal (figure 3), however its mean is positive 
which tends to decline in income, age, and number of children (age non-significant though). While it seems reasonable that richer people consume lower fat milk in general, at first sight it 
may not look so for the households with many kids. It is known that milk fat is conducive to 
child brain development, especially in the early ages; however we should bear on mind that all 
we control for is children under 18, so great many households sampled might have kids closer to 
18 (we do not observe their age). Taking a closer look at figure 4 reveals that households with no 
or only one kid tend to purchase more of milk with higher fat content, while those with more 
kids tend to have disutility for fat.  
The mean coefficients for fixed product characteristics (constant and fat content) are obtained via 
GLS  regression  of  coefficients  capturing  product  fixed  effects  on  these  characteristics. 
Chamberlains  minimum  distance  statistic  is  rather  high  attesting  to  how  well  the  product 




Estimated elasticity measure from the logit and random coefficient models are presented in table 
5. Own-price elasticities for the logit model (column 1) vary significantly across the milk 
manufacturers from the lowest -4.08 for the J&J milk  to as high as -1.17 for the private labels, 
with the the average of -2.63 and standard deviation of 1.32. This supports the conjecture that 
specialty milk (such as lactose free, organic) as produced by J&J and Organic Valley are viewed 
as luxury products relative to plain milk. The distribution of cross-price elasticities (column 2) 
also varies notably by manufacturers and retailers with mean 0.017 and standard deviation of 
0.031. Private labels turned out to have the highest measure which implies that these products are 
the most sensitive to increases in prices of national brands. Even if the logit elasticities might look realistic further analysis based on them will lileky be misleading. For instance, logit model 
will predict inelastic own-price elasticity (as it is proportional to own price) and subsequantly 
higher market power measure for private label milk irrespective of its marginal cost. Furthermore, 
it yields the same cross-price elasticty for a product with respect to the ones with identical 
market shares without regard to their characteristics. 
Own-price elasticities from the random coefficient demand (column 3)  manifest less variation 
with mean -2.72 and standard deviation of 0.29. As  in the logit case, private label has the least 
elastic and specialty milk has the most elastic own-price measure. Cross-price elasticities are 
generally higher for each product vis-à-vis logit with mean 0.04 and standard deviation of 0.02. 
Here milk produced by a local processor and private labels are most sensitive to rising national 
brand prices which seems realistic.  
 
Lerner Index estimates across milk manufacturers and retail chains 
 
Table 6 summarizes the Lerner indices of price markups for the supply scenarios under study. 
The medium markups across the products range from the lowest 33.3 % in the manufacturer only 
collusion to as high as 84.9 % in a scenario of vertical collusion/monopoly. In cases of monopoly 
and retailer collusion we also obtained markup estimates above 100 % for some products in 
some markets, which results in negative measures of marginal cost. In manufacturer collusion for 
some products we obtained negative measure of Lerner index, implying marginal cost exceeded 
milk price.  
 
 Statistical tests for the supply scenarios 
 
To determine the supply scenario that provides the best fit to the dataset underlying this study we 
perform two types of statistical testing procedures which essentially test how well the various 
cost components and markups estimated explain the actual retail prices (Villas-Boas, 2007).  
First we regress the retail prices on the retailer and manufacturer markup estimates along with 
the cost components and perform a joint test of the both markups being no different from one. 
This is performed at a product level and for linear, logarithmic, and exponential cost functions. 
The result of the test from the demand model with constant marginal cost provide most support 
to the hybrid model (2) followed by the nonlinear model with retailers being the residual 
claimants (3.1) . The more general model, however, picks the model 3.1 followed by the model 
of vertical monopoly (6) as best fit. This procedure gives a feel for how well the alternative 
supply models perform given the data at hand, neverthless, since one rarely knows the exact 
forms of manufacturer and retailer marginal cost functions we employ a more general test as 
proposed by Smith, 1992. It builds up on a Cox-type test statistic (Cox, 1962) of distance 
between the objective functions of any two competing supply models that are incompletely 
specified. The specificity of the test is that one model is always true by construction (the true 
model is hypothesized by the null unless outperformed by the alternative). To perform the test 
we now project the recovered marginal costs on manufacturer and retailer cost components via 
GMM estimation procedure and obtain the Cox-type statistic values for all pairs of scenarios. 
After normalizing and standardizing these values we then obtain their respective p-values from 
the standard normal distribution. (table 7). Table 7  reports the p-values of the GMM test statistic 
for the demand models with constant marginal utility. The rows present the supply models under the null hypothesis, and the columns present the competing alternatives. At 10 % level of 
significance it is evident that the nonlinear model with manufacturers engaged in perfect 
competition with retailers being the only profit maximizers (3.1) provides the best match to data 
on manufacturer and retailer costs. This is because the model 3.1 outperforms the remaining 
scenarios, in the meatime surviving against all the alternative. For comparison, Villas-Boas 
(2007) also finds this supply scenario superior to the rest of models under study.  
 
     Conclusions 
 
This manuscript studies the market conduct of milk manufacturers and retail chains in a 
Midwestern state in the United States. It utilizes cross-sectional and time series variation in 
market-level milk data and annual variation in consumer demographics to estimate structural 
parameters of random coefficient demand model, and navigates through several models of 
vertical interactions on the supply side for the best match with manufacturer and retailer cost 
data.  
Results show that demand model with underlying constant marginal costs supports a supply 
scenario with retailers being the only decision makers and manufacturers following marginal cost 
pricing rule. Later they may collect a part or full rents from the retailers through two-part tariffs. 
The findings of this study are important in the light of increased interest in market conduct of 
players in milk supply chain on the part of the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. 
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 Figure 1 Farm level and retail prices of whole milk in a major city in a Midwestern state  
 





















1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 2004 2005 2006 2008 2009
Milk price at farm level Retail price for whole milk price differentialTable 1 Products defined as combinations of manufacturer-retailer-milk fat  
Product  Manufacturer  Retail Chain  Fat Content  # of 4-Weeks  Not in Months 
1  Bareman's Dairy  2  Skim  78 
    2  Bareman's Dairy  2  Reduced   78 
    3  Bareman's Dairy  2  Whole  78       
4  Dean Foods Co  1  Skim  78 
    5  Dean Foods Co  3  Skim  78 
    6  Dean Foods Co  1  Low  53  27-51, 
  7  Dean Foods Co  1  Reduced   78 
    8  Dean Foods Co  3  Reduced   78 
    9  Dean Foods Co  1  Whole  78 
    10  Dean Foods Co  3  Whole  78       
11  J&J  1  Skim  78 
    12  J&J  3  Skim  78 
    13  J&J  1  Low  41  18,19,42-51 
  14  J&J  1  Reduced   78 
    15  J&J  3  Reduced   78 
    16  J&J  1  Whole  66  2-11,15,17 
  17  J&J  3  Whole  78       
18  Private Label  1  Skim  71  1-7, 
  19  Private Label  3  Skim  78 
    20  Private Label  3  Low  78 
    21  Private Label  1  Reduced   71  1-7, 
  22  Private Label  3  Reduced   78 
    23  Private Label  1  Whole  71  1-7, 
  24  Private Label  3  Whole  78       
25  Organic Valley  1  Skim  65  1-5, 71-78 
  26  Organic Valley  1  Low  63  1-7, 71-78 
  27  Organic Valley  1  Reduced   65  1-5, 71-78 
  28  Organic Valley  1  Whole  65  1-5, 71-78    
29  Bareman's Dairy  2  Skim  78    
  30  Bareman's Dairy  2  Reduced   78 
    31  Bareman's Dairy  2  Whole  78       
32  Dean Foods Co  3  Skim  78 
    33  Dean Foods Co  6  Skim  78 
    34  Dean Foods Co  6  Low  78 
    35  Dean Foods Co  3  Reduced   78 
    36  Dean Foods Co  6  Reduced   78 
    37  Dean Foods Co  3  Whole  78 
    38  Dean Foods Co  6  Whole  78       
39  J&J  3  Skim  78 
    40  J&J  6  Skim  78 
   41  J&J  3  Low  42  45-69,71-78 
  42  J&J  6  Low  78 
    43  J&J  3  Reduced   78 
    44  J&J  6  Reduced   78 
    45  J&J  3  Whole  78 
    46  J&J  6  Whole  63  1.0-15    
47  Private Label  2  Skim  43  1.0-35 
  48  Private Label  3  Skim  78 
    49  Private Label  6  Skim  78 
    50  Private Label  3  Low  78 
    51  Private Label  6  Low  78 
    52  Private Label  2  Reduced   43  1.0-35 
  53  Private Label  3  Reduced   78 
    54  Private Label  6  Reduced   78 
    55  Private Label  2  Whole  43  1.0-35 
  56  Private Label  3  Whole  78 














 Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Price, Container Size, and Market Share 
   Mean  S. D.  Min  Max 
Price (cents/half a pint)  29.372  14.731  10.486  56.810 
Product share across markets 
(%)  1.468  2.741  0.001  14.238 
Aggregate product share (%)  38.946  7.557  21.745  52.214 
Average container size  (pints)  5.004  1.738  1.128  8.000 
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 Table 3 Results from the Multinomial Logit Demand 
      Logit        IV Logit    
Variable  (a)  (b)  (c)  (a)  (b)  (c) 
Price  -8.440  -8.439  -8.758  -8.713  -8.712  -8.998 
   0.215  0.215  0.205  0.251  0.251  0.242 
Milkfat 
 
-0.196  -1.077 
 
-0.191  -1.297 
     0.009  0.043    0.010  0.051 
Mean(Income($ US)/Family 
size)     
1.297 
   
1.379 
       0.086      0.108 
Mean(Household head's age) 
   
0.535 
   
0.857 
       0.069      0.098 
Mean(Number of children < 
18)     
1.749 
   
1.820 
       0.097      0.106 
              
R  0.940  0.940  0.946       
F statistic: Cost coefficients=0             
              
Note: The dependent variable in each regression is the difference between the log of actual market shares and that 










 Table 4 Results from the Random Coefficient Logit Demand Model 








HH head's Age  # of Child <18 
Price  -17.820
***  0.096  0.161  3.363
***  -5.394
*** 







  0.137  0.086  0.200  0.037  0.179 
Fat content  0.083a
***  0.620
***  -0.646
*  -0.117  -0.867
*** 
  0.003  0.052  0.333  0.141  0.232 
GMM objective      747.270     
2 χ stat 
    6.14E+04     
Price coef.>0 
    0.017%     
   Note: GMM estimates are obtained based on 4139 observations. Bold identifies the estimates that are statistically 
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Mean fat coefficient across number of children < 18 Table 5 Mean elasticity estimates for logit and random coefficient demand models 
   Logit model 
 
Random coefficients model 
   Own price  Cross price 
 
Own price  Cross price 
           Mean  St. Dev. 
Manufacturer             
Local  -1.368  0.001    -2.787  0.059  0.114 
Dean  -3.101  0.005    -2.799  0.032  0.056 
J&J  -4.079  0.001    -2.886  0.022  0.035 
Private label  -1.169  0.049    -2.440  0.056  0.115 
Organic Valley  -3.993  0.000    -2.988  0.022  0.035 
             
Retailer chain             
Chain 1  -2.995  0.010    -2.996  0.038  0.073 
Chain 2  -1.295  0.001    -2.603  0.058  0.111 
Chain 3  -2.765  0.030    -2.652  0.036  0.069 
Chain 4  -2.931  0.016    -2.585  0.031  0.056 
             
Average all  -2.628  0.017 
 




Table 6 Vertical Lerner Index across the supply scenarios (%) 
Supply scenario  Medium  S.D.  Min  Max 
1. Double marginalization  54.9  7.1  43.7  64.7 
2. Hybrid model  57.0  3.7  49.0  62.2 
3.1. Retailer as residual claimant  45.1  3.6  38.5  51.5 
3.2. Manuf. as residual claimant  41.7  4.2  35.3  62.0 
4. Manufacturer collusion  33.3  27.9  -43.6  66.0 
5. Retail collusion  83.1  6.9  70.8  109.8 
6. Monopoly  84.9  11.4  69.8  110.7 
 
 
 Table 7 Pairwise non-nested test for supply scenarios estimated by GMM  
          Competing alternative models       
Model under null hypothesis  1  2  3.1  3.2  4  5  6 
1.    Double marginalization 
 
0.46  0.07  0.30  0.39  0.15  0.13 
2.    Hybrid  0.45 
 
0.07  0.30  0.38  0.15  0.12 
3.1. No wholesale margin  0.43  0.41 
 
0.12  0.20  0.13  0.10 
3.2. No retailer margin  0.48  0.50  0.05 
 
0.34  0.17  0.14 
4.    Manufacturer collusion  0.47  0.48  0.06  0.27 
 
0.16  0.14 
5.    Retailer collusion  0.36  0.38  0.06  0.33  0.43 
 
0.07 
6.    Vertical monopoly  0.35  0.37  0.06  0.34  0.44  0.08    
Notes: These are p-values from pairwise Cox-type statistics as proposed by Smith, 1992. The models under null 
hypothesis are provided in the row, and the alternative models are in columns. 
Source: Own  calculations. 
 